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INTRODUCTION  
Between 1981and 2011 public authorities and private corporations made four different attempts 
to implement very high speed rail lines between Miami, Orlando, and Tampa, Florida, on which 
trains would run at top speeds over 200 miles per hour.
1
 Yet, at present, the only new passenger 
line that is likely to begin operations between these cities is not very high speed, and will not run 
on dedicated track. All Aboard Florida (AAF), a subsidiary of the Fortress Investment Group, has 
proposed to operate trains at between 79 and 125 miles per hour, on upgraded freight rights of 
way between Miami and Orlando, with a possible future extension to Tampa. Why did all the 
earlier attempts at very high speed lines fail, while a moderate speed line appears likely to 
succeed? This paper answers this question by analyzing the political and financial history of 
Florida’s attempts at very high speed rail. In addition, because this paper was prepared for a 
conference on the history of the Channel Tunnel, it addresses the question of how financing for 
that project affected Florida’s attempts at very high speed rail.  
The Florida case is important because, in at least three ways, it is representative of broader trends 
in American high speed rail history. First, the most significant factors influencing high speed rail 
finance in the U.S. were evident in Florida between 1981 and 2011. Second, events in Florida in 
the 1980’s influenced the way promoters approached subsequent initiatives throughout the U.S., 
in the 1990’s and beyond. Third, Florida is only State where, as of this date, a new, privately 
operated, passenger rail line is under construction. Since this proposed, new line will operate at 
moderate, not very high speed, on existing track, it provides comparative information that helps 
explain why earlier plans did not come to fruition. In short, Florida’s history contains most of the 
elements needed to understand why very high speed rail has not yet been implemented anywhere 
in the U.S. 
 
                                               
1 Trains that run at speeds of 150 miles per hour and faster are defined as “very high speed” by the International 
Union of Railways. Top speeds of 200 miles per hour are not unusual for many very high speed trains. 
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THE RISE OF NEO-LIBERALISM AND ITS EFFECTS  
Most research attributes the failure of early high speed initiatives in Florida to the inability of 
sponsors to overcome local opposition, and/or inability to attract sufficient capital investment. 
While generally correct, these explanations are too narrow. The early high speed rail initiatives 
were unsuccessful primarily because a new ideology and set of policies, called neo-liberalism, 
came to dominate American politics in that period. Neo-liberalism changed the rules governing 
capital markets, thereby affecting opportunities for capital investment. It also provided key 
elected officials at State and federal levels with justifications for actions taken to prevent 
construction of high speed lines.  
Neo-liberalism developed in reaction to a long period of government activism in the United 
States. After the end of World War 2, the U.S. began 30 years of economic growth, which was 
partly stimulated by public interventions on behalf of particular industries. In the rail sector, for 
example, the U.S. Congress passed the High Speed Ground TransportationAct, in 1965,
2
  which 
led to a decade of federally funded grants to railroads and rail manufacturers for research on, and 
development of high speed technology, and studies of the feasibility of operating high speed 
trains on the particular corridors, such as in the Northeast (NEC), Texas, Florida, and California.
3 
Trains called Metroliners and Turbotrains, with electric and gas turbine locomotive technology 
capable of very high speed (150 miles per hour), were developed in the late 1960’s. While these 
trains were unable to operate in commercial service on the NEC because roadbed, catenary 
wires, and signals were too deteriorated, they set a precedent and nurtured the growth of 
individuals, agencies, and authorities that would subsequently work to implement very high 
speed rail in the U.S.    
However, in the mid-1970’s the American economy entered an extended period where 
recessionary conditions combined with high inflation. Termed “stagflation,” these conditions 
increased federal budget deficits and unemployment, and in reaction to this, neo-liberalism, grew 
in popularity, especially during the presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981-1988). The Reagan 
Administration advocated free market economics, which meant a reduced role for government 
                                               
2 Public Law 89-220; 79 Statutes 893. 
3 Congress of the United States, "U.S. passenger rail technologies. Chapter 5, passenger rail history ", ed. Office of 
Technology Assessment (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office 1983). 
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through cuts in spending, and elimination of public subsidies and loans for new projects, such as 
high speed rail lines. Neo-liberalism called on the private sector to determine economic 
outcomes through market choices. By the early 1980’s, this was the political and economic 
environment in which sponsors of high speed rail projects had to operate.  
With neo-liberalism as context, sponsors of high speed rail in Florida looked to raise capital from 
banks and other private institutional investors; to create revenue streams by developing real 
estate along rail lines; and to purchase existing high speed train technology from foreign 
manufacturers. They were optimistic about this approach partly because the Channel Tunnel 
project between England and France, one of the largest and most costly rail infrastructure 
projects in history, set a precedent for private financing. Margaret Thatcher, the neo-liberal 
British Prime Minister when the Channel Tunnel contracts were signed, in 1986, pushed 
forcefully for strictly private financing of that project and, at least initially, her arguments were 
supported by positive results. One investment banker who worked in Florida stated that “our 
American partners were truly impressed by this (Channel Tunnel) achievement, all the more so 
because it (initially) had met a lot of skepticism with(in) the U.S. financial community. Only one 
American bank, Citibank, joined the circa 200 bank lending syndicate (for the Channel Tunnel 
project).” 4 In addition to the Channel Tunnel, high speed rail was taking off in a number of other 
countries, setting precedents for what might be achieved in Florida. For example, Japan 
successfully introduced very high speed trains into commercial service in the 1960’s. France, 
Sweden and others followed in the 1970’s and 1980’s. American rail professionals and public 
officials, who visited those countries, returned with the belief that similar projects could be 
implemented in the U.S. Not surprisingly, then, rail promoters in Florida embraced neo-
liberalism because they believed it provided a viable set of principles to rely on for implementing 
high speed rail plans, and because it’s successes abroad could be duplicated in the U.S.   
 
MAJOR ACTORS IN RAIL DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
Four groups were the main promoters of initiatives to implement very high speed rail in Florida:  
                                               
4 Personal communication, 9 January, 2016. 
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1. Rail professionals and the agencies in which they worked—such as Alan Boyd, the first 
President of the National Passenger Railway Corporation (Amtrak), and Gilbert Carmichael, 
head of the Federal Railroad Administration—were strong proponents of high speed passenger 
rail;  
 
2. Construction and engineering firms that specialized in major infrastructure projects, such 
Fluor-Daniel and Skanska, expected high speed rail construction to be an important profit center;  
3. Real estate and land development firms, such as Tishman Speyer Properties, envisaged 
property development near high speed rail lines as lucrative retail, commercial, and residential 
building opportunities;  
 
4. The rail industry, including foreign rail manufacturers, such as GEC Alstom, ASEA, Brown, 
Boveri (ABB), and Siemens; their North American subsidiaries, such as the Bombardier; and 
operating companies, such as the French National Railway Company (SNCF) and the Japanese 
National Railway Company—all wanted to export their rail technology and expertise to what 
was potentially a very large American rail market;
 5
 
 
5. American investment banks, such as First Boston and Bear Stearns, envisioned opportunities 
to earn large fees advising project sponsors. Also, foreign banks, such as the National Bank of 
Paris (BNP), supported the efforts of their nation’s train operators and manufacturers to penetrate 
the American market.   
 
Based on preliminary research, it appears that most of these American and foreign groups were 
neither proponents, nor opponents, of neo-liberal propositions. At least in the 1980’s, they were 
mainly focused on selling their products and expertise in a new American high speed rail 
marketplace. However, when the Channel Tunnel project experienced serious financial problems 
in the early 1990’s, institutional investors and other players came to realize the risks inherent in 
the neoliberal approach of fully private project financing, and changed their approach. In short, 
positions taken by the various groups involved with high speed rail in the U.S. changed over 
time.  
 
 
                                               
5 The French wanted to sell their Train à Grande Vitesse (TGV) technology; Japan wanted to export their Bullet 
Train; and Sweden had trains using tilting technology that could run at high speed through sharper than normal 
curved track, which could be applied in Florida. 
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FLORIDA HIGH SPEED GROUND TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1984 
In 1981, the Miami Chamber of Commerce, which represented the powerful business community 
of that city, issued a report proposing a new, very high speed rail line between Miami, Orlando, 
and Tampa, three populous cities which were also tourist destinations for millions of visitors, and 
potential train passengers. The report suggested that the new line could be financed entirely from 
private resources, such as through property development along the route.
6
 Attracted to high 
speed rail after riding Japan’s Bullet Train, Florida’s Governor, Bob Graham, created a High 
Speed Rail Committee, which reported, in 1984, that a new rail line was feasible for Florida and 
could be privately financed.  
Graham was a Democrat and, although on a national level, Democrats generally favored activist 
government policies, Southern Democrats had a long history of opposing interference by  
authorities in the affairs of individual citizens, including a particular aversion to increased 
taxation to fund projects such as high speed rail.
7
 Therefore, when the State Legislature passed a 
High Speed Rail Act in 1984, it prohibited “pledging the full faith, credit, or taxing power of the 
state, toward retirement of…bonds,”8 which ruled out public financing for the project. Instead, 
the Act envisioned financing primarily from two areas: tax exempt borrowing and real estate 
development. A High Speed Rail Transportation Commission, with independent powers, was 
created to oversee implementation of this strategy. The Commission could issue tax exempt 
bonds;
9
 require co-location of rail lines on State highway rights of way; use their powers of 
eminent domain to purchase private land for rights of way; and require Florida’s county 
governments (local authorities) to cooperate on financing arrangements, such as imposition of 
tax assessments, which would provide revenue for rail franchisees—most of these being ways to 
                                               
6 T.  Billitteri, " Is there a bullet train in Florida’s future," Florida Trend July(1982). 
7 N. Rae, Southern Democrats  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).  
 
8 Chapter 84-207, Laws of Florida, 1984: section 10. Texas, similarly, explicitly prohibited the expenditure of state 
funds to help finance construction or operations of an approved high speed rail line.  Also  , in California, the 
Passenger Rail Financing Commission Act, established the California Passenger Rail Financing Commission, which 
could issue up to $1.25 billion in construction bonds, but those bonds were “not deemed to constitute a debt or 
liability of the state…or a pledge of the faith and credit of the state…payable solely (from revenues of the project).” 
(1982 Statutes, Chapter 1553) 
 
9 However, the Commission could not fund or guarantee those bonds because of the prohibition on public financing. 
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tap into Florida’s burgeoning real estate market. In short, the 1984 Act set Florida on a path to 
developing high speed rail based on neoliberal assumptions about private financing. 
 
FINANCING HIGH SPEED RAIL THROUGH REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT  
Capturing value from property development was certainly not a new idea in American rail 
history. Railroads in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century often earned profits by selling land near their 
tracks, or by developing property to sell, rent, or lease. Florida seemed well situated to build on 
these precedents. Property values had been increasing in the State since the end of World War 2, 
based partly on rapid population growth and partly on burgeoning tourism. An early 1980’s 
study prepared for Governor Graham reported that, while “the excess of annual passenger 
revenues over annual operating costs falls well short of the remaining annualized capital funding 
requirement (to construct a very high speed rail line),…(t)he development potentials associated 
with high speed rail stations…provide (the) funding opportunities necessary to assure financial 
viability.”10 In other words, while ridership revenue would not cover both operating expenses 
and interest on construction debt, revenue from Florida’s largest growth industry—real estate—
could make up for that deficit.  
The 1984 High Speed Rail Act institutionalized the real estate financing strategy by 
“encourag(ing)…agreements with (the) franchisee to develop financing arrangements such as 
benefit assessment districts, tax increment financing, station cost sharing…and development 
impact fees.”11 In addition, it proposed that increments in projected future tax receipts that 
accompanied real estate projects be used to pay the debt service on bonds that were issued to 
finance line construction. The Florida High Speed Rail Commission, which was chaired by a real 
estate executive, Malcolm Kirschenbaum—founder of Wolfe, Kirshenbaum, and Peeples, P.A., 
property developers—could mandate that local governments implement impact fees and tax 
                                               
 
10 Barton-Aschman Associates, "Florida HSR Study, Interim Report 5, Economic impact and development," 
(Tallahassee, Florida1984). 
 
11 Florida High Speed Rail Act, 1984: section 20, subsection 6 
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assessments.
12
 Finally, the two groups preparing to bid for the rail development franchise, 
Florida TGV and The Florida High Speed Rail Corporation, recruited real estate companies to 
serve on their boards of directors. For example, Florida TGV recruited Tishman Speyer 
Properties, a major Florida real estate development firm. In short, studies sponsored by the State 
supported a real estate financing strategy; the 1984 Act provided the High Speed Rail 
Commission with powers to support and regulate this approach, and Governor Graham appointed 
real estate executive to head the Commission; and the two groups bidding for a franchise 
recruited real estate firms to facilitate their planning.  
Not surprisingly, then, when these two consortia issued their initial project financing plans, they 
placed heavy reliance on revenues from real estate. Florida TGV included $600 million in real 
estate revenue in its initial plan. Florida High Speed Rail Corporation included an even higher 
figure, $3.8 billion in real estate revenue, or $125-$130 million per year, over 30 years.
13
 Given 
that total projected spending on the new line was $6-7 billion, real estate was projected to 
provide significant financial support for the rail project.   
All of this planning, however, was not sufficient to assure success. The real estate financing 
approach also required political consensus. Both local authorities and State agencies had to 
review and approve real estate development projects, and the State legislature had to approve any 
final financial plans that included real estate revenues. Since the 1984 High Speed Rail Act 
designated the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) as the agency to approve matters 
related to real estate development along a new rail corridor, their role was crucial. Yet, DCA was 
wary of financial incentives in the 1984 Act that might undermine their growth management 
policies. During the decades after World War 2, when Florida was developing rapidly and 
without much public control, DCA officials lobbied for limits on unregulated growth. They made 
progress in this regard before the 1984 Act was passed, and did not want to see that progress 
undermined. Thus, while significant opportunities existed for financing very high speed rail with 
real estate revenues, sponsors could not tap those resources without convincing DCA and local 
                                               
12 A. C. Nelson, "Impact Fees as an emerging method of infrastructure finance," Florida Policy Review Winter, no. 2 
(1987). 
13 J. Bottcher, "What happenend to high speed rail in Florida?," in High speed ground transportation systems: 
planning and engineering 
ed. M. Bondada, Wayson, R. (New York: American Society of Civil Engineers, 1993). 
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authorities that their plans would not harm State and local interests.
14
 Even after passage of the 
1984 Act, that outcome was not assured. 
  
FINANCING HIGH SPEED RAIL WITH DEBT 
Revenue from real estate development was also not, by itself, sufficient to finance the entire cost 
of a new rail line. Rail promoters needed to generate additional capital from loans, a standard 
component of project finance. One type of loan was particularly important for assuring viable 
financing. Private activity, industrial development bonds, paid interest that, if approved by 
authorities, were exempt from federal, state, and local taxes, which made them attractive to  
private investors. The 1984 Act empowered the Florida High Speed Rail Commission to issue 
this kind of debt, assuming the federal government provided federal tax exemption.  
State and local governments used tax exempt bonds as early as the 19
th
 century to stimulate 
economic development. Most of this debt was used for public purpose projects, such as building 
schools, but some also financed private projects which  served a public purpose, such as 
hospitals.
15
 After relatively slow growth in the early 20
th
 century, private activity debt issuances 
in the U.S. grew rapidly after the end of World War 2, rising from just over $1 billion, in 1946, 
to $57.7 billion in 1985.
16
 To slow this growth, Congress enacted The Revenue and Expenditure 
Control Act of 1968, which excluded many types of private activity from qualifying for tax 
exemption.
17
 High speed rail was one of those excluded activities. Sponsors of high speed rail in 
Florida wanted the federal government to change that policy because, with a tax exemption, their 
                                               
14 Barton-Aschman Associates, "Florida high speed rail study: policy, financing, and management issues," 
(Tallahassee, Florida1984). 
 
15 C. Johnson, Rubin, M.  , "The municipal bond market: structure and changes," in Handbook of Public Finance, 
ed. F. Thompson, Green, M. (New York: Marcel Decker, 1998). 509. Because high speed rail lines form part of a 
larger network of services, including highway and air transport, they serve public purposes. 
 
16 G. Auten, Chung, E., "Private activity tax exempt bonds, 1986," (1986). Johnson, "The municipal bond market: 
structure and changes." This growth was slowed, but not stopped, by the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 
1968, which restricted the type of private activities that qualified for tax exemption. 
 
17 Public Law 90-364; 82 Statutes 251. Signed into law June 28, 1964. 
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bonds could be issued at lower interest rates, which would lower overall project costs.
18
 Also, tax 
exempt bonds would attract investors, who would not be obliged to pay federal taxes on interest 
earnings. Thus, when Florida TGV requested that the authorities provide access to the tax 
exempt debt market, they estimated that “the difference in interest, over a 30 year period, 
amounts to over $1 billion” on (our) proposed $3.5 billion financial plan.19  
However, in the 1980’s, the national political environment was not conducive to this kind of 
financing. The neoliberal Reagan Administration considered the federal tax exemption for 
private activity bonds an inappropriate intervention of public authorities in private markets. 
Congress agreed. In an early 1980’s report, the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation 
argued that tax exempt industrial development bonds represent “an inefficient allocation of 
capital,” and cost the federal government significant amounts of lost tax revenue.20 As a result, 
Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,
21
 which set limits on the amount or volume 
of federally tax exempt debt that states were allowed to issue for “qualified” private activities. 
Even when the pool of qualified activities was broadened, in 1986, it continued to exclude high 
speed rail.
22
  
Finally, in 1988, after much lobbying by supporters, high speed rail was named as a qualified 
private activity.
23
 But, the law and subsequent Internal Revenue Service regulations included 
important restrictions. While 75% was outside the cap and could qualify for tax exemption, 25% 
of the proceeds of a high speed rail bond issuance were subject to the volume cap. And the 75% 
exclusion applied only to high speed rail lines that were publicly owned. If the line was not 
public—as was going to be the case in Florida for a period of decades before the property was 
turned over to the State—100% of bond proceeds were outside the volume cap, and in that case 
the private owner(s) could not claim any depreciation deductions or investment tax credits on the 
property financed with tax exempt bonds.
24
 This attenuated the financial advantages of tax 
exemption, since depreciation deductions were an important benefit for private investors. In 
                                               
18 S. Maguire, "Private activity bonds: an introduction," (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006). 
19 R. Blanchette, "Remarks," in High Speed Ground Transportation Association (Tampa, Florida1989). 
20 Maguire, "Private activity bonds: an introduction.". Page 2, note 8. 
21 Public Law 98-369 
22 Maguire, "Private activity bonds: an introduction.". Table 2, page 10.  
23 Internal Revenue Code, Section 142 
24 Maguire, "Private activity bonds: an introduction.". Page10, note b. 
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short, while the 1988 law provided financial incentives to potential investors, it also set 
restrictive conditions, which limited the applicability of tax exempt debt for the Florida project. 
 
WHY VERY HIGH SPEED RAIL FAILED IN FLORIDA¸ 1981-1991 
The Florida High Speed Rail Commission began public hearings in early 1988 to examine 
financing plans for the rail project, in preparation for selecting a franchisee. At this time, the 
federal government had not yet added high speed rail debt to the list of qualified, tax exempt, 
private activities. As the hearings commenced, Florida TGV, one of the two consortia applying 
for a franchise, made a startling announcement: “our (s)tudies show that the State of Florida will 
have to consider public support to get the infrastructure underway. Real estate revenues can 
reduce the level of public support, but…cannot supplant it.”25 In essence, Florida TGV 
challenged the fundamental financial assumption of the 1984 High Speed Rail Act, that a rail line 
could be built and operated solely with private financing. Their request for public support led to 
many months of negotiations, but in the end the High Speed Rail Commission rejected their plan. 
As a result, Florida TGV withdrew its application for a franchise.
26
  
At about this time in the process, the Commission had begun its own reassessment of using real 
estate value capture to finance the project. They sponsored a study that found a large backlog of 
already approved, but not yet constructed, development projects “which…potentially (offer) 
competition to projects built as ancillary facilities to high speed rail.”27 In addition, the study 
found that 500-700 special tax assessment districts already existed, some along the proposed 
Miami, Orlando, Tampa rail corridor.
28
 This suggested that an additional “high speed rail special 
district with ad valorem taxing authority may find resistance in this environment.”29 In short, the 
Commission found that opportunities to capture revenue from property development were 
significantly more limited than had been anticipated in the early-to-mid-1980’s.30 This caused 
                                               
25 Florida High Speed Rail Transportation Commission, A presentation of the Florida TGV, March 25 1988. 
26 Bottcher, "What happenend to high speed rail in Florida?.". 558. 
27 M. Smith, "Assessment of growth management and local government and real estate benefits associated with high 
speed rail development," (Miami, Florida: University of Florida, 1990).. 43. 
28 Ibid.. 57. 
29 Ibid.. 75. 
30 Ibid.. 53. 
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the remaining franchise applicant, Florida High Speed Rail Corporation (FHSRC), to adjust its 
financial plans, first reducing real estate revenues by 50%, then even further in subsequent 
proposals.
31
   
The real estate financing strategy suffered an even more serious setback in 1989, when the U.S. 
economy entered a recession, which ended the phenomenal growth of the three previous decades 
in Florida’s real estate market. This definitively precluded the possibility of using appreciation in 
property values to finance very high speed rail. Thus, in a revised financial plan submitted in 
1990, FHSR Corporation turned to the public sector for support, as had Florida TGV two years 
earlier, and asked for a 2.5 cent increase in Florida’s motor fuel tax. Their proposition to increase 
taxes was, however, “not warmly received, and FHSR Corporation was unable to gain the 
political support necessary to further the idea.”32 Soon thereafter FHSRC withdrew their 
franchise application.  
In sum, the 1980’s initiative to implement very high speed rail in Florida failed for three reasons: 
first, because project sponsors followed the flawed neoliberal assumption that the private sector 
would support their project without significant public backing. In fact, private investors were 
only willing to assume risk for a project, if the State of Florida, or federal authorities, either 
guaranteed their loans, and/or to directly contributed public funding. But, the 1984 High Speed 
Rail Act forbade the use of public guarantees, or budget appropriations to pay debt service. 
Second, project sponsors wanted exemption from taxes on the interest earned from bonds issued 
to fund rail line construction. However, federal legislation in 1984 and 1986, under the neoliberal 
Reagan Administration, excluded high speed rail from the list of qualified private activities. 
Third, real estate financing, which seemed so promising in the early 1980’s, also turned out to be 
based on false assumptions: that large amounts of property were available for development, in 
return for which impact fees could be assessed and used to finance the new high speed line; and 
that property values would continue to appreciate for the foreseeable future. Studies showed that 
much of the land along the proposed Miami-Orlando-Tampa rail corridor was already owned and 
approved for development, and hundreds of tax assessment districts had already been established 
by local authorities, who did not respond positively to the idea of adding further assessments. 
                                               
31 Bottcher, "What happenend to high speed rail in Florida?.". 558-59. 
32 Ibid.. 559. 
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Also, the State Department of Community Affairs (DCA), which had led the way in developing a 
growth management plan for Florida in the 1970’s and early 1980’s, was opposed to a large 
amount of new development associated with high speed rail.  
As a result, first Florida TGV, then Florida High Speed Rail Corporation asked the State to 
provide public financing in the form of increased taxes. But, new taxes were politically 
unpopular for both Florida’s citizens and public officials. Thus, not surprisingly, when he 
assumed office in January of 1991, Lawton Chiles, the newly elected Governor, said of the 
FHSR Corporation’s financing plan, “this dog won’t hunt,”33 meaning the proposal for 
implementing very high speed rail in Florida was not viable. The first attempt at very high speed 
rail in Florida had failed.  
 
 SECOND INITATIVE: 1990-PRESENT  
Chiles’ rejection was not based on neo-liberal ideology. Quite the contrary, he supported the goal 
of high speed rail for Florida, and worked with the State Legislature on a new approach to 
financing and governing project implementation. In 1992, with Chiles’ support, the legislature 
passed amendments that made commitments of annual budget appropriations on behalf of a new 
rail line, and authorized State issuance of tax exempt bonds, if and when the federal government 
approved such bonds. Public funding was contingent on private sponsors making significant 
contributions of equity capital. Finally, Florida’s Department of Transportation (FDOT) was 
assigned responsibility for overseeing project implementation, not a semi-independent 
commission, as had been the case in the 1980’s. In short, under Governor Chiles, Florida moved 
from a neo-liberal, fully private approach to a public-private partnership (P-3) framework to 
implementing a new rail plan.  
Florida’s move away from neo-liberalism was matched by similar changes at the federal level. 
Most importantly, in 1998, Congress enacted the Transportation Infrastructure Financing and 
Improvement Act (TIFIA), which provided direct federal credit as well as credit guarantees for 
                                               
33 "Five billion dollar plan for bullet train will not fly ", Miami Herald November 9 1990.. 4b. 
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infrastructure projects, and allowed federal loans to be subordinate to senior private debt.
34
 This 
allowed authorities to fund projects they believed had the greatest chance for success, a sharp 
break from Reagan’s neo-liberal policies of market-based choice. 
These shifts away from neo-liberalism were partly influenced by the failure of the Channel 
Tunnel’s private finance scheme. In the early 1990’s, massive public support was required to 
prevent tunnel project bankruptcy. Equity investors lost most of their money. Banks took losses 
on their loans. As a result, investors lost confidence in neo-liberal policies, which affected the 
Florida project. For example, the Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP), which, as part of the TGV 
Consortium in the 1980’s, had supported fully private financing, by the 1990’s, as part of the  
Florida Overland Express (FOX) consortium, came to believe that a public-private partnership 
(P-3) financing strategy was a more viable approach.
35
   
In 1996, the Florida Department of Transportation selected FOX as franchisee to design, build 
and operate a very high speed line between Miami, Orlando, and Tampa, at a cost of $6.1 billion, 
using French TGV technology.
36
 Given the changed environment at the State and federal levels, 
FOX was able to develop a robust financial plan that drew from diverse sources. Specifically, 
project capital came from tax exempt State bonds secured by the $70 million/year State 
legislative appropriations, and tax exempt project bonds backed by fare revenue; from a $439 
million equity contribution from FOX; and from rolling stock leveraged leases. In addition, FOX 
counted on federal funding from TIFIA. During the period when the TIFIA legislation was being 
considered in Congress, FOX partners lobbied, and were rewarded when a Conference 
                                               
34
 However, neo-liberalism was not entirely dead. The 1990 Credit Reform Act, which was still in force, required 
that the estimated cost of TIFIA loans and guarantees, called “subsidy costs,” be appropriated by Congress. And, 
federal “budget scoring” rules meant that for any TIFIA credits, an equal amount of federal spending must be 
cut/eliminated in order to prevent any increase in the federal deficit. This restricted the provision of credit for 
infrastructure projects.  
35 For more on the Channel Tunnel, see papers prepared for Twenty Years Under the Channel and Beyond: a 
research and events programme to celebrate the 20th anniversa ry of the channel tunnel railway (www.ahicf.com). 
 
36 The main FOX partners were Flour Daniel (lead partner), Odebrecht Contractors, Bombardier, and GEC Alstom. 
 
15 
 
Committee report, in 1998, specifically named their project as a qualified recipient of TIFIA 
funds.
37
 FOX then included $2 billion in potential TIFIA funding in their financial plan.  
Private banks and other institutional investors supported this plan in various ways, including 
initial bond ratings advisory memos. Thus, by the late 1990’s, sponsors had high hopes that the 
FOX project would be implemented. But, some important neoliberal politicians, such as John 
Kasich, Chairman of the House of Representatives Budget Committee, were not so positively 
disposed. Kasich asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to examine the viability of 
very high speed rail financing in the U.S. In January of 1999, GAO issued a report which 
specifically called into question many of the FOX financial plan propositions, not least that the 
federal government would commit most of $2 billion in available TIFIA funds to that single 
project.
38
 This provided Jeb Bush, a neo-liberal who was elected to succeed Governor Chiles, 
with the political “cover,” or justification, for one of his earliest official actions. In January, 
1999, he refused to approve the first $70 legislative appropriation for FOX. He opposed project 
implementation partly because committing the State’s full faith and credit to backing project 
bonds could be very expensive in the event of a default, and partly because he said State funds 
could be better used for other, non-high-speed transport priorities.
39
 Soon thereafter, FOX 
withdrew its offer to build a very high speed line. The second attempt at high speed rail in 
Florida had failed. 
In conclusion, although a neo-liberal Governor killed the 1990’s very high speed rail initiative, 
the circumstances were very different than in the 1980’s. In the 1990’s, FOX had received 
commitments of annual State appropriations, federal approval of tax exempt borrowing, and 
(potentially) TIFIA funding, which was partially matched by commitments of private equity and 
private rolling stock leases—a P-3 framework for financing gained considerable public and 
private investor support before Bush was elected Governor. This was different from the 1980’s, 
when project sponsors relied entirely on private funding, with revenues coming from Florida’s 
burgeoning real estate market, and loans from private, institutional investors. The 1980’s project 
                                               
37 U.S. Congress, "Conference Committee Report," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998). 
HR 105-550. 
38 General Accounting Office, "Surface Infrastructure: High Speed Rail Projects in the United States," (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1999). 
39 Mark Silva, "Bullet train hits a big obstacle--Jeb Bush," Miami Herald, January 14 1999. 
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was intrinsically neoliberal in its financing strategy, and failed because the private sector was 
unwilling to assume all of the project’s risks. The 1990’s project, on the other hand, relied on a 
P-3 approach, which had broad support among private investors, but which a  neo-liberal 
Governor opposed, and vetoed. Neo-liberalism caused the failure of both projects, but in very 
different circumstances each time. 
 
AFTERWORD 
After the failure of the 1990’s initiative, promoters tried two more times, between 2000 and 
2011, to implement very high speed rail in Florida. These initiatives also failed. At present, the 
only new passenger line that is likely to begin operations in the near future is not very high 
speed, and will not run on dedicated track. All Aboard Florida (AAF), a subsidiary of the 
Fortress Investment Group, has proposed to operate trains at between 79 and 125 miles per hour, 
on freight rights of way that it owns between Miami and Orlando. Because it will run on 
existing, but upgraded track, the AAF passenger line will be significantly less expensive to build 
than grade separated, very high speed infrastructure. For this reason it is much more likely to 
succeed than earlier projects. At the same time, Fortress’ financial plan is not unlike those 
proposed in the 1980’s and 1990’s. It relies on a combination of revenues from real estate, which 
it already owns along the route, and federally approved, tax exempt, private activity debt. 
Fortress recently began building large, mixed use, commercial-residential, developments at 
station sites in Miami, Ft. Lauderdale, and West Palm Beach, and predicts that the tourist and 
business trade on their new line will provide enough traffic to make their station developments 
highly profitable. In short, even if train operations, by themselves, are not profitable, Fortress 
says it will earn profits from its associated real estate developments.  
If the Fortress project is financially successful, this implies that earlier initiatives in Florida 
would have been more likely to succeed if they had adopted a less expensive, moderate speed 
approach. Considerable historical evidence suggests that very high speed rail lines so expensive 
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to construct that they cannot be profitable, except in very rare situations?
40
 This evidence is also 
germane to the contemporary American situation in Texas and California, where promoters are 
planning new—and especially in the California case—very expensive, very high speed rail lines. 
Would these new lines be more likely to succeed if they were built at lower cost for moderate 
speed? Or would that defeat the purpose of very high speed, which is designed to be sufficiently 
competitive with alternative modes of transport to capture riders exactly because of its very high 
speed? Regrettably, a more in-depth analysis of these questions and issues is beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, relevant information is provided in other papers and reports that I have 
recently written.
41
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